

Global Antidumping Database Version 1.0

Chad P. Bown^{†,‡}

Brandeis University

This version (1.0): August 2005

[Original version (1.0): August 2005]

Abstract

This paper describes a newly collected, detailed database on national governments' use of the antidumping (AD) trade policy instrument. The data collection project was funded by the Development Research Group of the World Bank and Brandeis University. While still preliminary, it goes beyond existing, publicly-used sets of antidumping data in a number of fundamental ways. It is a first attempt to use original source national government documentation to organize information on products, firms, the investigative procedure and outcomes of the historical use (since the 1980s) of the antidumping policy instrument across large importing country users. We also report more and recent data on a number of smaller users of AD, as well as some limited information on the use of countervailing measures from national governments that are users of countervailing duty (CVD) laws.

Database Website: http://www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/

[†] Department of Economics and International Business School, Brandeis University, MS 021, PO Box 549110 Waltham, MA 02454-9110, USA; tel: 781-736-4823; fax: 781-736-2269; email cbown@brandeis.edu, web: <http://www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/>.

[‡] Funding for the data collection project is through the World Bank with contributions from a Mazer Award and Tomberg Funds from Brandeis University. I would also like to thank the hospitality of the World Bank (DECRG) which I was visiting while this project was initiated, as well as the Brookings Institution which I was visiting during some of the data collection. For helpful work collecting the data in this project I would especially like to thank the research assistance of David Cheong, Gloria Sheu, Nabeela Alam and Jaewoo Nakajima. Assistance in data acquisition at various stages of the process was also provided by Rebecca McKibbin, Gustav Brink, Honorio Kumé, Eric Haven, Jayanta Roy, Hilda Fridh and Kwang Hyok Yoo whose efforts are appreciated. I also thank Bernard Hoekman, Tom Prusa, Bruce Blonigen, James Durling, Nuno Limão, Robert Feinberg, Kara Reynolds, Michael Moore, Patrick Messerlin, J. Michael Finger, Maurizio Zanardi and Meredith Crowley for helpful discussions. Any opinions expressed in this paper are mine alone and should not be attributed to the World Bank. Data errors and corrections should be emailed to cbown@brandeis.edu.

Table of Contents

1	Introduction.....	1
2	Countries and Data Included in the Global Antidumping Database.....	9
	2.1 The “Master” Spreadsheet for Each Country – AD-CTY-Master.....	16
	2.2 The “Product” Spreadsheets – AD-CTY-Products.....	18
	2.3 The “Domestic Firms” Spreadsheets – ADT-CTY-Domestic-Firms.....	18
	2.4 The “Foreign Firms” Spreadsheets – ADT-CTY-Foreign-Firms.....	19
3	More Country-Specific Information on AD Sources and Data.....	19
	3.1 Argentina (ARG).....	22
	3.2 Australia (AUS).....	23
	3.3 Brazil (BRA).....	25
	3.4 Canada (CAN).....	25
	3.5 Colombia (COL).....	28
	3.6 European Union (EUN).....	30
	3.7 India (IND).....	31
	3.8 South Korea (KOR).....	32
	3.9 Mexico (MEX).....	34
	3.10 New Zealand (NZL).....	35
	3.11 Peru (PER).....	37
	3.12 Turkey (TUR).....	38
	3.13 United States (USA).....	39
	3.14 Venezuela (VEN).....	41
	3.15 South Africa (ZAF).....	42
4	AD-Using Countries with Data on Initiations Only.....	43
5	Countervailing Duty-Using Countries in the Database.....	45
	5.1 The “Master” Spreadsheet for Each Country – CVD-CTY-Master.....	46
	5.2 The “Product” Spreadsheets – CVD-CTY-Products.....	47
	5.3 Canada (CAN).....	48
	5.4 Mexico (MEX).....	49
	5.5 United States (USA).....	50
6	Caveats for Data Use, Discovery of Errors, and Conclusions.....	52
	References.....	54

List of Tables

Table 1.1	International Use of Antidumping and the Global Antidumping Database.....	6
Table 2.1	Antidumping User Countries with Detailed Data in the Database.....	9
Table 2.2	Country Codes and Country Names Used in the Database.....	11
Table 2.1.1	Variables in the AD-CTY-Master Spreadsheets.....	16
Table 2.2.1	Variables in the AD-CTY-Products Spreadsheets.....	18
Table 2.3.1	Variables in the AD-CTY-Domestic-Firms Spreadsheets.....	18
Table 2.4.1	Variables in the AD-CTY-Foreign-Firms Spreadsheets.....	19
Table 3.1	User Countries' Antidumping Investigative Agencies, Government Reporting Publications and Website.....	20
Table 3.1.1	Additional Argentine Data Included in AD-ARG-v1.0.xls.....	22
Table 3.2.1	Additional Australian Data Included in AD-AUS-v1.0.xls.....	24
Table 3.3.1	Additional Brazilian Data Included in AD-BRA-v1.0.xls.....	25
Table 3.4.1	Additional Canadian Data Included in AD-CAN-v1.0.xls.....	26
Table 3.5.1	Additional Colombian Data Included in AD-COL-v1.0.xls.....	29
Table 3.6.1	Additional EU Data Included in AD-EUN-v1.0.xls.....	30
Table 3.7.1	Additional Indian Data Included in AD-IND-v1.0.xls.....	32
Table 3.8.1	Additional Korean Data Included in AD-KOR-v1.0.xls.....	33
Table 3.9.1	Additional Mexican Data Included in AD-MEX-v1.0.xls.....	34
Table 3.10.1	Additional Data from New Zealand Included in AD-NZL-v1.0.xls.....	36
Table 3.11.1	Additional Peruvian Data Included in AD-PER-v1.0.xls.....	37
Table 3.12.1	Additional Turkish Data Included in AD-TUR-v1.0.xls.....	39
Table 3.13.1	Additional US Data Included in AD-USA-v1.0.xls.....	39
Table 3.14.1	Additional Venezuelan Data Included in AD-VEN-v1.0.xls.....	41
Table 3.15.1	Additional South African Data Included in AD-ZAF-v1.0.xls.....	43
Table 4.1.1	Other Antidumping User Countries with Initiation Information Only in the Database.....	44
Table 4.1.2	Variables in the AD-OTH-Master Spreadsheets.....	45
Table 5.1	Antidumping User Countries with Detailed Data in the Database.....	45
Table 5.1.1	Variables in the CVD-CTY-Master Spreadsheets.....	46
Table 5.2.1	Variables in the CVD-CTY-Products Spreadsheets.....	48
Table 5.3.1	Additional Canadian Data Included in CVD-CAN-v1.0.xls.....	48
Table 5.4.1	Additional Mexican Data Included in CVD-MEX-v1.0.xls.....	50
Table 5.5.1	Additional US Data Included in CVD-USA-v1.0.xls.....	51

1 Introduction

The spread and proliferation of antidumping statutes around the world and the imposition of import-restricting antidumping (AD) measures imposed under the auspices of these laws has been well documented (Miranda, Ruiz and Torres, 1998; Prusa, 2001; Zanardi, 2004). Not surprisingly, researchers seeking to understand this phenomenon would like to empirically test between evolving theories relating to the spread of AD, as well as industry linkages to the use of AD across countries. Furthermore, policymakers, trade negotiators and even legal practitioners involved in the AD process in national localities are also interested in cross-country comparisons of political and/or legal elements of the process, as AD reform is a potential topic on the agenda of WTO negotiations, either during the Doha Round if not a future round of negotiations.¹ An improved understanding of antidumping requires access to data on its use, of course, so that this data can be effectively scrutinized.

Despite such interest in the international aspects of antidumping, empirical economic and political-economic research on antidumping has thus far focused primarily on its use by the United States first, and European Union a distant second.^{2, 3} Empirical research on other countries' use of antidumping has been extremely spartan in comparison, and even empirical research on the international (externality) implications of one country's use is only beginning to evolve.⁴

¹ See, for example, the symposium on the "Ten Major Problems" of ten countries' use of antidumping, ten years after establishment of the WTO, organized by Horlick and Vermulst (2005).

² Throughout this paper we may refer to the EU or EEC as a "country," for ease of exposition since the antidumping trade policy instrument is administered by the EU/EEC jointly and not by each individual member country.

³ For recent surveys on various aspects of the economics research literature on antidumping, see Blonigen and Prusa (2004) and Nelson (forthcoming). See also the collection of published articles reprinted in Nelson and Vandenbussche (forthcoming).

⁴ Exceptions include a handful of empirical studies which have used a cross-country data set collected by researchers at the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is a data set limited to antidumping case initiations and with information on products that is typically categorized only at the industry (2-digit) level, e.g., reported in Miranda, Ruiz and Torres (1998) with updates. Examples of papers that have used this data include Prusa and Skeath (2002, 2005) and Feinberg and Reynolds (forthcoming) which focus on retaliation threats. Related papers that motivate some of this emphasis on cross-country linkages also include Blonigen and Bown (2003) and Bown (2005). There is also some emerging research from other user countries which exploits more detailed data that has been collected on an individual basis - an example is the Mexican use of antidumping examined by Niels and Francois (forthcoming).

There are certainly many contributing factors to the resulting emphasis of research focused on the US antidumping process, for example. First, the United States is one of the most frequent “users” of the policy instrument. Until the mid-1990s, antidumping was used primarily by only four countries – the US, EU, Canada and Australia. A second explanation for focus on the United States is also the economic size of the market at stake and the value of imports affected by the policies. A third factor is that there is also readily available complementary data required for many political-economic empirical analysis, such as data on product-level trade flows, disaggregated industrial level economic activity, and even political activity such as lobbying expenditures or political influence on Congressional committees that may affect the process.⁵

In addition to these explanations, we believe that a fourth factor is an important determinant of substantial research on the US antidumping process relative to other countries: policy transparency and data availability. Researchers are more likely to scrutinize a policy when detailed information as to how it is being implemented is publicly available, which is the case for the United States’ use of antidumping.⁶ Furthermore, since 2000, Bruce A. Blonigen at the University of Oregon has provided an additional boost to research in this field by posting on the internet a collection of well-organized and comprehensive

Finally, papers examining the ramifications of antidumping on international trade flows use include Bown and Crowley (2005a, 2005b, forthcoming) and Prusa and Durling (forthcoming).

⁵ For example, historical data at high frequencies (e.g., monthly) on product level (at the 10-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule) trade flows is publicly available in the United States from the US International Trade Commission (<http://dataweb.usitc.gov/>). See also Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2001). Furthermore, historical data on industry level indicators of economic activity at the 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) or 6-digit North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) is also available from surveys posted by the US Census (<http://www.census.gov/mcd/index.html>). See also Bartelsman, Becker and Gray (2000).

⁶ Information on US antidumping investigations is published in the US government’s *Federal Register* publication, which can be accessed on line at <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/>. The US antidumping cases follow a numerically chronological categorizing process which makes tracking a single case over time through government records very straightforward. While information on European Union antidumping cases can similarly be found in its publicly available government publication titled the *Official Journal* (see <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/oj/>), its case categorizing process is not as transparent so as to allow an individual only minimal effort to be able to track the process of a single case over time.

US antidumping data (Blonigen, 2000), thus eliminating a substantial entry barrier to researchers interested in examination of the US process.⁷

The global antidumping database project described in this paper seeks to emulate the basics of Blonigen's data collection efforts and complement the data generated for the United States by establishing a relatively comprehensive, publicly available data base on other countries' use of antidumping. The purpose of this paper is to briefly describe the collected data, so as to provide researchers a starting point for examining other (non-US) users of the controversial trade policy. Our theory is that providing such data will eliminate some entry barriers to research in this area. We hope that additional entry by researchers will result in improved quality of empirical research on the global use of antidumping, like the Blonigen data collection efforts has done for the United States use of the policy. A last goal would be that results of scientific research would lead to additional transparency and understanding as to what is actually taking place under the guise of antidumping laws and policy around the world.

With respect to coverage, table 1.1 illustrates the countries that are included in the detailed portion of our database, as a subset of antidumping users (WTO members) over the 1995-2004 period. While close to 50 countries have now adopted antidumping laws and initiated antidumping investigations (Zanardi, 2004), it is still the case that most of the use of antidumping – as measured, for example, by total number of investigations or measures imposed – is highly concentrated into around a dozen countries. Thus while the current database contains detailed antidumping use data for (only) 15 of these policy-imposing countries, these countries collectively make up a substantial fraction of the policy's use – e.g., these countries were responsible for 85% of the antidumping investigations and 87% of antidumping measures imposed by all WTO members over the 1995-2004 period.

⁷ Thanks go to Bruce Blonigen for his collecting and original conception of publicly posting the antidumping data for the United States at his website at <http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bruceb/adpage.html>. His generation of this public good has arguably spawned additional research into antidumping, improving transparency and allowing for more in depth research to improve scientific understanding over the implications of the policy instrument. The current project is largely the result of researchers recognizing the Blonigen contribution and wondering why no one had done something comparable for other countries' use of AD. Additional personal thanks are also due to Tom Prusa for generously sharing his personal collections of antidumping data as well. Furthermore, Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak made data on the use of US antidumping for the 1980-1986 period (Staiger and Wolak, 1994) available on the NBER data CDs earlier in the 1990s (Feenstra, 1997).

Table 1.1 International Use of Antidumping and the Global Antidumping Database

Country	Number of Antidumping Investigations, 1995-2004	Number of Antidumping Measures Imposed, 1995-2004
User-Countries in the Global Antidumping Database		
Argentina	192	139
Australia	172	54
Brazil	116	62
Canada	133	80
Colombia	23	11
European Union	303	193
India	400	302
Mexico	79	69
New Zealand	47	14
Peru	55	34
South Africa	173	113
South Korea	77	43
Turkey	89	77
United States	354	219
Venezuela	31	25
Subtotal (share of total)	2244 (84.8%)	1435 (86.7%)
User-Countries not yet in the Global Antidumping Database		
China (since 2001)	99	52
Egypt	38	30
Indonesia	60	23
Israel	27	15
Malaysia	31	18
Taiwan (since 2000)	8	2
Thailand	34	23
Other WTO Members	105	58
Subtotal (share of total)	402 (15.2%)	221 (13.3%)
Total	2646	1656

Source: Data for the initiations and measures used in this table is taken from WTO (2005a,b).

Before turning to a discussion of the actual data, it is important to highlight a number of data collection hurdles affecting the structure of our approach as well as the end product. First, there is a

substantial fixed cost to collect data for each new user country that is added to the database. Given the leniency allowed by the WTO's Agreement on Antidumping, there is substantial heterogeneity across countries as to how national laws are implemented and investigations proceed – i.e., each new user country is free to implement its antidumping law and investigative process as it sees fit, provided it is generally consistent with a basic set of principles under the WTO's Agreement on Antidumping.⁸ Thus there are a number of different administrative approaches that each new user country could take.

Second, the WTO imposes only a minimal reporting requirement on member countries' use of the policy instrument which is insufficient from a research perspective.⁹ While the WTO collects information on AD investigation initiations and measures imposed, it does not appear to systematically collect, organize and publicize data on the actual products (HS codes) under investigation, the dates of preliminary and final decisions and imposition of measures, or the names of firms involved in the investigations. This is the minimal amount of information required for empirical economic researchers to accurately match up AD case information with independently-generated data series on trade flows and other economic activity that is critical to assessing the impact of AD.

Thus, the data that we have collected for each of the countries described in section 2 goes beyond what the WTO has made available. Whenever possible, our data derives from original source, national government publications located primarily on domestic government websites, where a number of countries have quite detailed information available. Nevertheless, in a number of instances important elements of the data were only available in hard copy at government depositories in national capitals. For these countries, we dispatched research assistants to these localities to collect the data.¹⁰

⁸ One reason why the WTO's Agreement on Antidumping is so lenient is likely because of pre-existing variation in how antidumping was administered by the "old users" who did not want to have too much of their existing procedure changed. For example, Canada's antidumping law was first enacted in 1904, Australia's was enacted in 1906, etc.

⁹ See for example the WTO's website "Notifications under the agreement on implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994" at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/antidum3_e.htm , last accessed on 20 August 2005.

¹⁰ This resulted in an additional fixed cost of finding and training new research assistance with the language skills and in the (physical) geographic location to translate original source information into our data base.

Given these hurdles, our relatively modest goal was to provide both a basic set of minimal information across countries that is essential for economic research while also including additional information, whenever it was available, for countries that report “more” than the basics. Thus, for a substantial number of user countries we have a basic set of information on Harmonized System product codes for the goods that were allegedly dumped and a cause of injury, as well as dates and outcomes of various stages of the investigative process. For most of these countries we were also able to collect information on the names of domestic firms participating in the antidumping investigation, the names of foreign firms being targeted by the investigation, and also the firm-specific outcomes facing those foreign producers at the outcome stage of antidumping investigation that result in the imposition of measures.

Equally important was our intention of transparency for the project. Thus we also attempt to provide information on where and how we were able to collect the data for each country, so that researchers have the ability to go back to original source documentation and both check the accuracy of our data as well as to augment the data for their own use. We make no claim to have fully exploited all of the data available in these government notifications.

Finally, given the fixed cost associated with data collection for each user country added to the database, the data set at this stage is not comprehensive. With limited resources, our strategy in data construction was to first focus collecting data for the largest and historically active user countries. Thus, as table 1.1 indicates, while we arguably have decent data on roughly 85% of the use of antidumping by WTO members there are a number of relatively new users (e.g., China, Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand) as well as smaller users and even non-members of the WTO for which detailed data has not yet been collected and compiled.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the variables and the data contained in the global antidumping database that is common across the 15 user countries. Section 3 then provides more details for each of the 15 user countries on additional, country-specific data included in the database, as well as particular elements of missing data for each user. Section 4 provides a brief discussion of the WTO Member countries that are also users of antidumping but that are not yet part

of the global antidumping database, and the limited data that is available for them from the WTO. Section 5 describes the detailed data on countervailing duty use for three countries that we were able to collect. Section 6 discusses some additional caveats to using the antidumping data and concludes.

2 Countries and Data Included in the Global Antidumping Database

The basic contribution of the data set is to provide a standardized set of information for as many users of the antidumping policy instrument as possible. To that end, we have collected a reasonably consistent set of detailed data for 15 different user countries, listed in table 2.1.

Table 2.1 : Antidumping User Countries with Detailed Data in the Database

Country Code (3-letter CTY)	Country Name	Excel Workbook File Name	Spreadsheet Names within Country Workbook	Available Years of Data	Current Version (last updated)
ARG	Argentina	AD-ARG-v1.0.xls	AD-ARG-Master , AD-ARG-Products , AD-ARG-Domestic-Firms , AD-ARG-Foreign-Firms	1996-2004	v1.0 (8/2005)
AUS	Australia	AD-AUS-v1.0.xls	AD-AUS-Master , AD-AUS-Products , AD-AUS-Domestic-Firms , AD-AUS-Foreign-Firms	1989-2004	v1.0 (8/2005)
BRA	Brazil	AD-BRA-v1.0.xls	AD-BRA-Master , AD-BRA-Products	1988-2003	v1.0 (8/2005)
CAN	Canada	AD-CAN-v1.0.xls	AD-CAN-Master , AD-CAN-Products , AD-CAN-Domestic-Firms , AD-CAN-Foreign-Firms	1985-2005	v1.0 (8/2005)
COL	Colombia	AD-COL-v1.0.xls	AD-COL-Master , AD-COL-Products	1991-2004	v1.0 (8/2005)
EUN	European Union	AD-EUN-v1.0.xls	AD-EUN-Master , AD-EUN-Products , AD-EUN-Domestic-Firms , AD-EUN-Foreign-Firms	1987-2005	v1.0 (8/2005)
IND	India	AD-IND-v1.0.xls	AD-IND-Master , AD-IND-Products , AD-IND-Domestic-Firms , AD-IND-Foreign-Firms	1992-2004	v1.0 (8/2005)

KOR	South Korea	AD-KOR-v1.0.xls	AD-KOR-Master , AD-KOR-Products , AD-KOR-Domestic-Firms , AD-KOR-Foreign-Firms	1986-2004	v1.0 (8/2005)
MEX	Mexico	AD-MEX-v1.0.xls	AD-MEX-Master , AD-MEX-Products , AD-MEX-Domestic-Firms , AD-MEX-Foreign-Firms	1987-2003	v1.0 (8/2005)
NZL	New Zealand	AD-NZL-v1.0.xls	AD-NZL-Master , AD-NZL-Products , AD-NZL-Domestic-Firms , AD-NZL-Foreign-Firms	1995-2004	v1.0 (8/2005)
PER	Peru	AD-PER-v1.0.xls	AD-PER-Master , AD-PER-Products , AD-PER-Domestic-Firms , AD-PER-Foreign-Firms	1992-2002	v1.0 (8/2005)
TUR	Turkey	AD-TUR-v1.0.xls	AD-TUR-Master , AD-TUR-Products , AD-TUR-Domestic-Firms , AD-TUR-Foreign-Firms	1990-2004	v1.0 (10/2005?)
USA	United States	AD-USA-v1.0.xls	AD-USA-Master , AD-USA-Products , AD-USA-Domestic-Firms , AD-USA-Foreign-Firms	1980-2005	v1.0 (8/2005)
VEN	Venezuela	AD-VEN-v1.0.xls	AD-VEN-Master , AD-VEN-Products , AD-VEN-Domestic-Firms , AD-VEN-Foreign-Firms	1992-2002	v1.0 (8/2005)
ZAF	South Africa	AD-ZAF-v1.0.xls	AD-ZAF-Master , AD-ZAF-Products , AD-ZAF-Domestic-Firms , AD-ZAF-Foreign-Firms	1992-2004	v1.0 (8/2005)

Note that we use the 3-letter UN country symbol to identify both the antidumping using countries (table 2.1), and then also the foreign countries that may be subject to the antidumping investigation (table 2.2 below), as even something as seemingly simple as the exact spelling of country names can differ across countries and sources of data.

Table 2.2 : Country Codes and Country Names Used in the Database

Alphabetic, by Code		Alphabetic, by Country Name	
Code	Country Name	Code	Country Name
ABW	Aruba	AFG	Afghanistan
AFG	Afghanistan	ALA	Åland Islands
AGO	Angola	ALB	Albania
AIA	Anguilla	DZA	Algeria
ALA	Åland Islands	ASM	American Samoa
ALB	Albania	AND	Andorra
AND	Andorra	AGO	Angola
ANT	Netherlands Antilles	AIA	Anguilla
ARE	United Arab Emirates	ATG	Antigua and Barbuda
ARG	Argentina	ARG	Argentina
ARM	Armenia	ARM	Armenia
ASM	American Samoa	ABW	Aruba
ATG	Antigua and Barbuda	AUS	Australia
AUS	Australia	AUT	Austria
AUT	Austria	AZE	Azerbaijan
AZE	Azerbaijan	BHS	Bahamas
BDI	Burundi	BHR	Bahrain
BEL	Belgium	BGD	Bangladesh
BEN	Benin	BRB	Barbados
BFA	Burkina Faso	BLR	Belarus
BGD	Bangladesh	BEL	Belgium
BGR	Bulgaria	BLZ	Belize
BHR	Bahrain	BEN	Benin
BHS	Bahamas	BMU	Bermuda
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	BTN	Bhutan
BLR	Belarus	BOL	Bolivia
BLZ	Belize	BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BMU	Bermuda	BWA	Botswana
BOL	Bolivia	BRA	Brazil
BRA	Brazil	VGB	British Virgin Islands
BRB	Barbados	BRN	Brunei Darussalam
BRN	Brunei Darussalam	BGR	Bulgaria
BTN	Bhutan	BFA	Burkina Faso
BWA	Botswana	BDI	Burundi
CAF	Central African Republic	KHM	Cambodia
CAN	Canada	CMR	Cameroon
CHE	Switzerland	CAN	Canada
CHL	Chile	CPV	Cape Verde
CHN	China	CYM	Cayman Islands
CIV	Côte d'Ivoire	CAF	Central African Republic
CMR	Cameroon	TCD	Chad
COD	Democratic Republic of the Congo	CHL	Chile
COG	Congo	CHN	China
COK	Cook Islands	COL	Colombia
COL	Colombia	COM	Comoros
COM	Comoros	COG	Congo
CPV	Cape Verde	COK	Cook Islands
CRI	Costa Rica	CRI	Costa Rica
CSV	Czechoslovakia (pre-1993)	CIV	Côte d'Ivoire
CUB	Cuba	HRV	Croatia

CYM	Cayman Islands	CUB	Cuba
CYP	Cyprus	CYP	Cyprus
CZE	Czech Republic	CZE	Czech Republic
DEU	Germany	CSV	Czechoslovakia (pre-1993)
DJI	Djibouti	COD	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DMA	Dominica	DNK	Denmark
DNK	Denmark	DJI	Djibouti
DOM	Dominican Republic	DMA	Dominica
DZA	Algeria	DOM	Dominican Republic
ECU	Ecuador	GDR	East Germany (pre-1989)
EGY	Egypt	ECU	Ecuador
ERI	Eritrea	EGY	Egypt
ESH	Western Sahara	SLV	El Salvador
ESP	Spain	GNQ	Equatorial Guinea
EST	Estonia	ERI	Eritrea
ETH	Ethiopia	EST	Estonia
EUN	European Union	ETH	Ethiopia
FIN	Finland	EUN	European Union
FJI	Fiji	FRO	Faeroe Islands
FLK	Falkland Islands	FLK	Falkland Islands
FRA	France	FJI	Fiji
FRG	West Germany (pre-1989)	FIN	Finland
FRO	Faeroe Islands	FRA	France
FSM	Micronesia	GUF	French Guiana
GAB	Gabon	PYF	French Polynesia
GBR	United Kingdom	GAB	Gabon
GDR	East Germany (pre-1989)	GMB	Gambia
GEO	Georgia	GEO	Georgia
GHA	Ghana	DEU	Germany
GIB	Gibraltar	GHA	Ghana
GIN	Guinea	GIB	Gibraltar
GLP	Guadeloupe	GRC	Greece
GMB	Gambia	GRL	Greenland
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	GRD	Grenada
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	GLP	Guadeloupe
GRC	Greece	GUM	Guam
GRD	Grenada	GTM	Guatemala
GRL	Greenland	GIN	Guinea
GTM	Guatemala	GNB	Guinea-Bissau
GUF	French Guiana	GUY	Guyana
GUM	Guam	HTI	Haiti
GUY	Guyana	VAT	Holy See
HKG	Hong Kong	HND	Honduras
HND	Honduras	HKG	Hong Kong
HRV	Croatia	HUN	Hungary
HTI	Haiti	ISL	Iceland
HUN	Hungary	IND	India
IDN	Indonesia	IDN	Indonesia
IND	India	IRN	Iran
IRL	Ireland	IRQ	Iraq
IRN	Iran	IRL	Ireland
IRQ	Iraq	ISR	Israel
ISL	Iceland	ITA	Italy
ISR	Israel	JAM	Jamaica
ITA	Italy	JPN	Japan
JAM	Jamaica	JOR	Jordan

JOR	Jordan	KAZ	Kazakhstan
JPN	Japan	KEN	Kenya
KAZ	Kazakhstan	KIR	Kiribati
KEN	Kenya	KWT	Kuwait
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	KGZ	Kyrgyzstan
KHM	Cambodia	LAO	Laos
KIR	Kiribati	LVA	Latvia
KNA	Saint Kitts and Nevis	LBN	Lebanon
KOR	South Korea	LSO	Lesotho
KWT	Kuwait	LBR	Liberia
LAO	Laos	LBY	Libya
LBN	Lebanon	LIE	Liechtenstein
LBR	Liberia	LTU	Lithuania
LBY	Libya	LUX	Luxembourg
LCA	Saint Lucia	MAC	Macao
LIE	Liechtenstein	MKD	Macedonia
LKA	Sri Lanka	MDG	Madagascar
LSO	Lesotho	MWI	Malawi
LTU	Lithuania	MYS	Malaysia
LUX	Luxembourg	MDV	Maldives
LVA	Latvia	MLI	Mali
MAC	Macao	MLT	Malta
MAR	Morocco	MHL	Marshall Islands
MCO	Monaco	MTQ	Martinique
MDA	Moldova	MRT	Mauritania
MDG	Madagascar	MUS	Mauritius
MDV	Maldives	MYT	Mayotte
MEX	Mexico	MEX	Mexico
MHL	Marshall Islands	FSM	Micronesia
MKD	Macedonia	MDA	Moldova
MLI	Mali	MCO	Monaco
MLT	Malta	MNG	Mongolia
MMR	Myanmar	MSR	Montserrat
MNG	Mongolia	MAR	Morocco
MNP	Northern Mariana Islands	MOZ	Mozambique
MOZ	Mozambique	MMR	Myanmar
MRT	Mauritania	NAM	Namibia
MSR	Montserrat	NRU	Nauru
MTQ	Martinique	NPL	Nepal
MUS	Mauritius	NLD	Netherlands
MWI	Malawi	ANT	Netherlands Antilles
MYS	Malaysia	NCL	New Caledonia
MYT	Mayotte	NZL	New Zealand
NAM	Namibia	NIC	Nicaragua
NCL	New Caledonia	NER	Niger
NER	Niger	NGA	Nigeria
NFK	Norfolk Island	NIU	Niue
NGA	Nigeria	NFK	Norfolk Island
NIC	Nicaragua	PRK	North Korea
NIU	Niue	MNP	Northern Mariana Islands
NLD	Netherlands	NOR	Norway
NOR	Norway	PSE	Occupied Palestinian Territory
NPL	Nepal	OMN	Oman
NRU	Nauru	PAK	Pakistan
NZL	New Zealand	PLW	Palau
OMN	Oman	PAN	Panama

PAK	Pakistan	PNG	Papua New Guinea
PAN	Panama	PRY	Paraguay
PCN	Pitcairn	PER	Peru
PER	Peru	PHL	Philippines
PHL	Philippines	PCN	Pitcairn
PLW	Palau	POL	Poland
PNG	Papua New Guinea	PRT	Portugal
POL	Poland	PRI	Puerto Rico
PRI	Puerto Rico	QAT	Qatar
PRK	North Korea	REU	Reunion
PRT	Portugal	ROU	Romania
PRY	Paraguay	RUS	Russia
PSE	Occupied Palestinian Territory	RWA	Rwanda
PYF	French Polynesia	SHN	Saint Helena
QAT	Qatar	KNA	Saint Kitts and Nevis
REU	Reunion	LCA	Saint Lucia
ROU	Romania	SPM	Saint Pierre and Miquelon
RUS	Russia	VCT	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
RWA	Rwanda	WSM	Samoa
SAU	Saudi Arabia	SMR	San Marino
SCG	Serbia and Montenegro	STP	Sao Tome and Principe
SDN	Sudan	SAU	Saudi Arabia
SEN	Senegal	SEN	Senegal
SGP	Singapore	SCG	Serbia and Montenegro
SHN	Saint Helena	SYC	Seychelles
SJM	Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands	SLE	Sierra Leone
SLB	Solomon Islands	SGP	Singapore
SLE	Sierra Leone	SVK	Slovakia
SLV	El Salvador	SVN	Slovenia
SMR	San Marino	SLB	Solomon Islands
SOM	Somalia	SOM	Somalia
SPM	Saint Pierre and Miquelon	ZAF	South Africa
STP	Sao Tome and Principe	KOR	South Korea
SUR	Suriname	USR	Soviet Union (pre-1992)
SVK	Slovakia	ESP	Spain
SVN	Slovenia	LKA	Sri Lanka
SWE	Sweden	SDN	Sudan
SWZ	Swaziland	SUR	Suriname
SYC	Seychelles	SJM	Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands
SYR	Syria	SWZ	Swaziland
TCA	Turks and Caicos Islands	SWE	Sweden
TCO	Chad	CHE	Switzerland
TGO	Togo	SYR	Syria
THA	Thailand	TWN	Taiwan
TJK	Tajikistan	TJK	Tajikistan
TKL	Tokelau	TZA	Tanzania
TKM	Turkmenistan	THA	Thailand
TLS	Timor-Leste	TLS	Timor-Leste
TON	Tonga	TGO	Togo
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago	TKL	Tokelau
TUN	Tunisia	TON	Tonga
TUR	Turkey	TTO	Trinidad and Tobago
TUV	Tuvalu	TUN	Tunisia
TWN	Taiwan	TUR	Turkey
TZA	Tanzania	TKM	Turkmenistan
UGA	Uganda	TCA	Turks and Caicos Islands

UKR	Ukraine	TUV	Tuvalu
URY	Uruguay	UGA	Uganda
USA	USA	UKR	Ukraine
UZB	Uzbekistan	ARE	United Arab Emirates
USR	Soviet Union (pre-1992)	GBR	United Kingdom
VAT	Holy See	URY	Uruguay
VCT	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	VIR	US Virgin Islands
VEN	Venezuela	USA	USA
VGB	British Virgin Islands	UZB	Uzbekistan
VIR	US Virgin Islands	VUT	Vanuatu
VNM	Viet Nam	VEN	Venezuela
VUT	Vanuatu	VNM	Viet Nam
WLF	Wallis and Futuna Islands	WLF	Wallis and Futuna Islands
WSM	Samoa	FRG	West Germany (pre-1989)
YEM	Yemen	ESH	Western Sahara
YUG	Yugoslavia (pre-1992)	YEM	Yemen
ZAF	South Africa	YUG	Yugoslavia (pre-1992)
ZMB	Zambia	ZMB	Zambia
ZWE	Zimbabwe	ZWE	Zimbabwe

Source: United Nations Statistics Division “Countries or areas, codes and abbreviations” website, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm>, last accessed on 21 July 2005. FRG (West Germany), CSV (Czechoslovakia), GDR (East Germany), TWN (Taiwan), USR (Soviet Union), Yugoslavia (YUG)– codes added by the author. Reproduced in the Database as [AD-CTY-Codes-Names.xls](#).

The data for each AD user country is contained in a Microsoft Excel 2003 Workbook file (named as in table 2.1 and posted at http://www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/), within which are typically four spreadsheets of data: 1) a master spreadsheet with basic antidumping case investigation information on dates and outcomes; 2) a spreadsheet containing information on the Harmonized System (HS) products under investigation; 3) a spreadsheet containing information on domestic firms involved in the antidumping petition; and 4) a spreadsheet containing information on foreign firms named in the antidumping petition.

We have also attempted to remove “empty” cells in the spreadsheets, as these affect the ability to easily transform the spreadsheets into machine-readable ASCII files for merging into other data sets. Thus a cell entry for missing data (i.e., data that we are confident exists, but which we were unable to find) was filled in with an “MI.” On the other hand, cell entries that were empty because there was no relevant data (e.g., because it never reached that phase of the antidumping investigation) are filled in with a “.” In some instances, this admittedly required judgment. For example, consider the failure to find any information

regarding consideration of the revocation of an antidumping measure – if no information was found, we typically assumed that the cell entry was not relevant (i.e., “.”) as opposed to the antidumping measure had been removed and the data was simply missing (i.e., “MI”).

The rest of section 2 details how each of these four basic spreadsheets is formatted for consistency across the AD-user countries.

2.1 The “Master” Spreadsheet for Each Country – AD-CTY-Master

Each country has a master spreadsheet presenting a common set of information. The AD-CTY-Master¹¹ spreadsheet has the same 21 initial column headings (Columns A through T) for each of the AD using countries. For each country, columns U through (END) may contain unique additional variables depending on the country’s nuances of its own antidumping process and the availability of reported information. Section 3 below describes the unique information for each country in columns U through (END), as well as descriptions of the sources of information for users that would like to go back and check/verify information in the data set or augment the data set for their own use. The following table describes the contents of the first 21 rows of each master spreadsheet for each country.

Table 2.1.1 : Variables in the AD-CTY-Master Spreadsheets

Column	Variable Name	Description
A.	AD_CTY_NAME	Country name of the user initiating the antidumping investigation
B.	CASE_ID	Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the data base [generated by us]
C.	CASE_REPCODE	Related antidumping investigations of multiple countries at the same time over the same product
D.	INV_CTY_NAME	Country name of the foreign country under investigation
E.	INV_CTY_CODE	3-letter UN country code of the foreign country under investigation (see table 2.2)
F.	PRODUCT	Description of the product under investigation
G.	INIT_DATE	Date of initiation of the investigation (MM/DD/YEAR)
H.	P_DUMP_DATE	Date of preliminary dumping decision (MM/DD/YEAR)
I.	P_INJ_DATE	Date of preliminary injury decision (MM/DD/YEAR)

¹¹ CTY is replaced with the 3-letter UN country code for each of the 15 user countries in the data set.

J.	P_DUMP_DEC	Preliminary dumping decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency), P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative), B(ypassed, as sometimes the preliminary decision is skipped and the first decision is the final decision), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of the investigation)
K.	P_INJ_DEC	Preliminary injury decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency), P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative), B(ypassed, as sometimes the preliminary decision is skipped and the first decision is the final decision), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of the investigation)
L.	P_AD_DATE	Date of imposition of preliminary antidumping measure (MM/DD/YEAR)
M.	P_AD_MEASURE	Preliminary antidumping measure imposed: AVD (= ad valorem duty), SD (= specific duty), PU (= price undertaking), DPU (=duty if price falls under a given level), SA (= suspension agreement)
N.	F_DUMP_DATE	Date of final dumping decision (MM/DD/YEAR)
O.	F_INJ_DATE	Date of final injury decision (MM/DD/YEAR)
P.	F_DUMP_DEC	Final dumping decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency), P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of the investigation)
Q.	F_INJ_DEC	Final injury decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency), P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of the investigation)
R.	F_AD_DATE	Date of imposition of final antidumping measure (MM/DD/YEAR)
S.	F_AD_MEASURE	Final antidumping measure imposed: AVD (= ad valorem duty), SD (= specific duty), PU (= price undertaking), DPU (=duty if price falls under a given level), SA (= suspension agreement)
T.	REVOKE_DATE	Date of revocation of antidumping order (MM/DD/YEAR)

Before describing the other spreadsheets available across countries, it is important to identify that for a number of countries, much of the data described in the master spreadsheet in one column would be redundant – i.e., the same as that found in another column. For example, for a “single track” country that has one government agency carrying out a simultaneous injury and dumping investigation, the preliminary dumping and injury decisions (and any measures imposed) might take place on the same date. The same is likely to be the case for final decisions as well. Because some countries have “dual track”

investigative processes, we have chosen this data presentation approach so as to have some standardization across country spreadsheets.

2.2 The “Product” Spreadsheets – AD-CTY-Products

Each user country also has a spreadsheet presenting information on the Harmonized System (HS) product codes listed in the antidumping investigation petition. The AD-CTY-Products spreadsheet has the same 3 initial column headings (Columns A through C) for each of the using countries, listed in table 2.2.1 .

Table 2.2.1 : Variables in the AD-CTY-Products Spreadsheets

Column	Variable Name	Description
A.	CASE_ID	Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the data base [generated by us]
B.	HS_CODE	Harmonized System product code for the product under investigation
C.	HS_DIGITS	Number of digits of the HS product code reported in HS_CODE

2.3 The “Domestic Firms” Spreadsheets – AD-CTY-Domestic-Firms

For many user countries, we also have a spreadsheet presenting a common set of information on domestic firms, trade associations and/or labor unions that are part of the filing of the antidumping investigation petition. The AD-CTY-Domestic-Firms spreadsheet has the same 2 initial column headings (Columns A and B) for each of the using countries, described in table 2.3.1.

Table 2.3.1 : Variables in the AD-CTY-Domestic-Firms Spreadsheets

Column	Variable Name	Description
A.	CASE_ID	Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the data base [generated by us]
B.	D_FIRM	Domestic firm, trade association, industry group, labor union, etc. that is part of the antidumping petition requesting the investigation

2.4 The “Foreign Firms” Spreadsheets – AD-CTY-Foreign-Firms

For many user countries, we also have a spreadsheet presenting a common set of information on foreign firms subject to the antidumping investigation, and, where available, the foreign-firm specific outcomes (e.g., level of duties imposed) at the resolution of the investigation. The AD-CTY-Foreign-Firms spreadsheet has the same 3 initial column headings (Columns A through C) as described in table 2.4.1.

Table 2.4.1 : Variables in the AD-CTY-Foreign-Firms Spreadsheets

Column	Variable Name	Description
A.	CASE_ID	Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the data base [generated by us]
B.	F_FIRM	Foreign firm under investigation in the antidumping petition
C.	F_AD_MEASURE_FIRM	Foreign firm-specific final antidumping measure imposed

3 More Country-Specific Information on AD Sources and Data

For each of the AD user countries for which we have detailed data formatted as described in section 2, we describe in this section the additional and “unique” information specific to each user country.

Table 3.1 reports the sources of much of our information on national government agencies handling the dumping and injury determination of the antidumping process, their websites (if available) and the names of official government documents in which antidumping investigation notifications are published.

Table 3.1 : User Countries' Antidumping Investigative Agencies, Government Reporting

Publications and Websites

Country	Government Agency Handling Dumping Investigation	Government Agency Handling Injury Investigation	Government Publications that Report Antidumping Activity
Argentina	Secretariat of Industry and Trade (Secretaría de Industria y Comercio)	National Commission of Foreign Trade (Comisión Nacional de Comercio Exterior (CNCE))	Resolutions and Acts published by the Documentation and Information Center of the Argentine Economic Ministry http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/
Australia	Dumping Unit of the Australian Customs Service	Dumping Unit of the Australian Customs Service	Commonwealth of Australian Gazette, Australian Financial Review, and Australian Customs Dumping Notices (ACDNs) http://www.customs.gov.au/
Brazil	Department of Commercial Defense (Departamento de Defesa Comercial (DECOM)) at the Secretariat of Foreign Trade (Secretaria de Comercio Exterior (SECEX))	Department of Commercial Defense (Departamento de Defesa Comercial (DECOM)) at the Secretariat of Foreign Trade (Secretaria de Comercio Exterior (SECEX))	Official Diary of the Union (<i>Diario Oficial da Uniao</i>), a circular of the Secretariat of Foreign Trade (SECEX) http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/secex/secex/competencia.php
Canada	Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Directorate of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima/menu-e.html	Canadian International Trade Tribunal http://www.citt-tcce.gc.ca/index_e.asp	<i>Canada Gazette</i> http://canadagazette.gc.ca/
Colombia	Subdirección de Prácticas Comerciales (Assistant Director of Trade Practices) in the Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo (Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Tourism) http://www.mincomercio.gov.co	Subdirección de Prácticas Comerciales (Assistant Director of Trade Practices) in the Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo (Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Tourism) http://www.mincomercio.gov.co	<i>Diario Oficial</i> http://www.imprensa.gov.co/print-int/HTML/frameset/inter_diariofi.htm
European Union	Trade Directorate of the European Commission	Trade Directorate of the European Commission	<i>Official Journal of the European Communities</i> http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en
India	Directorate General of Antidumping and Allied Duties in the Ministry of Commerce	Directorate General of Antidumping and Allied Duties in the Ministry of Commerce	<i>The Gazette of India</i> http://commerce.nic.in/ad_cases.htm
South Korea	Korean Trade Commission (KTC)	Korean Trade Commission (KTC)	Korean Official Gazette (Gwanbo) http://gwanbo.korea.go.kr/ http://www.ktc.go.kr/eng/main.asp

Mexico	Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales (UPCI, International Trade Practices Unit) in La Secretaría de Economía (Economic Secretary) http://www.economia.gob.mx/?P=104	Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales (UPCI, International Trade Practices Unit) in La Secretaría de Economía (Economic Secretary) http://www.economia.gob.mx/?P=104	<i>Diario Oficial de la Federación</i> http://dof.terra.com.mx/
New Zealand	Trade Remedies Group at the Ministry of Economic Development	Trade Remedies Group at the Ministry of Economic Development	New Zealand Gazette http://www.med.govt.nz/buslt/trade_rem.html
Peru	Comisión de Fiscalización de Dumping y Subsidio (Commission Inspecting Dumping and Subsidies) in INDECOPI http://www.indecopi.gob.pe/	Comisión de Fiscalización de Dumping y Subsidio (Commission Inspecting Dumping and Subsidies) in INDECOPI http://www.indecopi.gob.pe/	<i>El Peruano</i> http://www.elperuano.com.pe/
Turkey	“Board of Evaluation of Unfair Competition in Importation” (the Board) and the “Department of Dumping and Subsidy Investigation” (the Department)	“Board of Evaluation of Unfair Competition in Importation” (the Board) and the “Department of Dumping and Subsidy Investigation” (the Department)	<i>Resmî Gazete (Official Gazette)</i> published in Turkish with links to antidumping measures imposed and current investigations at http://www.dtm.gov.tr/ITHALAT/damping/dampgiris.htm
United States	International Trade Administration (ITA) in the Department of Commerce http://www.ita.doc.gov/	US International Trade Commission http://www.usitc.gov	<i>Federal Register</i> http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/
Venezuela	Comisión Antidumping y Sobre Subsidios (CASS) http://www.cass.com.ve/	Comisión Antidumping y Sobre Subsidios (CASS) http://www.cass.com.ve/	<i>Gaceta Oficial</i> http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta/gacetaoficial.asp
South Africa	Trade Remedies Directorates at the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)	Trade Remedies Directorates at the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)	International Trade Administration Commission Reports http://www.dti.gov.za/offering/offering.asp?oferingid=82

In each user country-specific section that follows below, we add basic information on each country’s antidumping process. We also describe key missing elements of the data that we experienced during the data collection. Finally, so as not to throw away useful, but country-specific information, for each country’s spreadsheets we describe the additional data columns in AD-CTY-Master, AD-CTY-

Products, AD-CTY-Domestic-Firms, AD-CTY-Foreign-Firms spreadsheets beyond the columns of data described in section 2.

3.1 Argentina (ARG)

Argentina uses a dual track system: dumping is assessed by the Secretariat for Industry and Commerce while injury is determined by the National Commission for Foreign Trade (CNCE). Antidumping decisions by the two agencies are contained in Acts (Actas) and Resolutions (Resoluciones), which are available through the Economic Ministry’s “Documentation and Information Centre.” The source of the underlying data was online publications of Acts and Resolutions via the website of the Economic Ministry’s Documentation and Information Centre as well as tables in Nogués and Baracat (2005), which describes more detail on the Argentine antidumping process.

The Argentine spreadsheet contains additional data beyond the standard information described in Section 2. The additional items are described in the table below.

Table 3.1.1 : Additional Argentine Data Included in AD-ARG-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-ARG-Master:		
U.	INIT_GP	The government publication initiating the investigation
V.	P_GP	The government publication containing the preliminary finding
W.	P_MEASURES_GP	The government publication containing the preliminary measures
X.	P_AD_DUTY	The preliminary antidumping duty imposed with details on the measure(s).
Y.	F_GP	The government publication containing the final finding
Z.	F_MEASURES_GP	The government publication containing the final measures
AA.	F_AD_DUTY	The final antidumping duty imposed with details on the measure(s).
AB.	F_AD_MARGIN(min)	The final minimum dumping margin found
AC.	F_AD_MARGIN(max)	The final maximum dumping margin found
AD.	DUTY_RULE	Either FD- Full duty or LD- Lesser Duty, where full duty implies the full dumping margin was imposed as an antidumping duty while lesser duty

		implies that the antidumping duty imposed was less than the full margin. <i>Source:</i> Nogués and Baracat (2005)
AE.	METHOD	Methodology used to determine the dumping margin (DM- Domestic market, TC- Third country, CB- Cost based) <i>Source:</i> Nogués and Baracat (2005)
AF.	TYPE	Either D-Dumping Case or RD -Review of Dumping Case <i>Source:</i> Nogués and Baracat (2005)

In terms of incomplete or missing data, the Argentine data set does not have complete information on the revocation or continuation of measures, as this information is only available for cases that have undergone a review. Furthermore, the database contains only partial information on foreign exporters as only some were named in the official documents.

3.2 Australia (AUS)

The Australian Customs Service (or Customs) is solely responsible for anti-dumping investigations and determines if dumping and/or injury has occurred for each case. The decisions of the Australian Customs Service's Dumping Unit are sometimes reviewed by a Trade Measures Review Officer from the Trade Measures Review Secretariat. The initiation and outcomes of each investigation are published in the Australian Commonwealth Gazette and in Australian Customs Dumping Notices (ACDNs), which are available online at the Customs website. The sources for data included in the database is online publications of Customs Notices and Reports at the Australian Customs website, as well as on-site inspection of Customs Documents at the Australian Customs Office in Canberra. Information about Australia's antidumping process is available as an online public document named "Australia's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Administration", which can be accessed via the Customs website. For a discussion of Australia's antidumping process see also Moulis and Gay (2005).

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the Australian spreadsheets contain additional data, which are described in the table below.

Table 3.2.1 : Additional Australian Data Included in AD-AUS-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-AUS-Master :		
U.	P_DUTY(MIN)	The minimum preliminary anti-dumping duty imposed
V.	P_DUTY(MAX)	The maximum preliminary anti-dumping duty imposed
W.	F_DUTY (MIN)	The minimum final anti-dumping duty imposed
X.	F_DUTY (MAX)	The maximum final anti-dumping duty imposed
Y.	INIT_GP_ACDN	The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice) containing the initiation of the case
Z.	P_GP_ACDN	The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice) containing the preliminary findings of the case
AA.	F_GP_ACDN	The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice) containing the final findings of the case
AB.	GP_ADD_ACDN	The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice) mentioning the imposition of antidumping duties
AC.	GP_ACDN_TERM	The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice) mentioning the termination of the case
AD.	GP_ACDN_REVOKE	The government publication (Australian Customs Dumping Notice) mentioning the revocation of anti-dumping measures
AE.	NOTES	Comments
In AD-AUS-Foreign-Firms:		
D.	P_DEC	The preliminary decision for the case in which the foreign exporting firm is involved
E.	F_DEC	The final decision for the case in which the foreign exporting firm is involved
F.	FIRM_D_MARGINS	The dumping margin assessed for the foreign exporting firm
G.	NOTES	Comments

In terms of missing or incomplete data, the Australian spreadsheet lacks details on final antidumping duties imposed such as Australian Customs Dumping Notice (ACDN) documents, dates on which antidumping duties were imposed, and the size of duties imposed for certain cases (especially those initiated between 1996 and 2004). Furthermore, the Australian data does not contain the outcomes of reviews.

3.3 Brazil (BRA)

Brazilian antidumping investigations are carried out solely by the Department of Commercial Defense (DECOM), which is part of the Secretariat for Foreign Trade (SECEX). The Secretariat itself is under the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Trade, and Industry. The outcomes of investigations are published by the Secretariat (SECEX) in circulars, some of which are available online at the Secretariat's website. The Brazilian data was provided by Honorio Kumé and is based on Kumé and Piani (2005), which includes a history and analysis of the use of antidumping in Brazil. See also Caetano (2005).

The Brazilian spreadsheet contains the standard data items described in section 2, as well as a few additional data items described below.

Table 3.3.1 : Additional Brazilian Data Included in AD-BRA-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable	Description
In AD-BRA-Master :		
U.	P_AD_DUTY	The preliminary antidumping duty imposed. If several duties were imposed, this column contains the maximum duty
V.	F_AD_DUTY	The final antidumping duty imposed. If several duties were imposed, this column contains the maximum duty
W.	TYPE	An indicator of review cases (R=review case)

In terms of missing or incomplete data, the Brazilian spreadsheet lacks data on the preliminary outcomes for certain cases. There is also no firm-level data (neither for domestic nor foreign firms).

3.4 Canada (CAN)

Canada's antidumping process has a two-track determination of injury and dumping. Dumping determinations are handled by the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Directorate of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), while injury determinations are made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT). Both bodies initiate their own investigations, each followed by preliminary and final decisions. Note however that this system was not used prior to mid-2000. Prior to 2000 the CBSA was

known as the CCRA (Canada Customs and Revenue Agency) and the CITT did not initiate a separate investigation in the preliminary phase. The CCRA would briefly discuss whether injury was evident if they found preliminary evidence of dumping. Then the CITT would begin a separate injury investigation only if the case proceeded to the final phase. Alternatively, if an interested party (such as a company named in the case) referred the preliminary issue of injury to the CITT, the tribunal would hold a preliminary investigation.

A number of data sources were used to collect the Canadian information. The primary resources were the websites of the CBSA and the CITT. If possible, any discrepancies in the data (such as a difference in a date listed in two separate sources) were decided in favor of the information found in the actual case files on these sites. However, for pre-1995 CCRA cases, hard copies were used because the site did not have coverage of that era. They were provided by the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Directorate and only covered final determinations. Therefore, information on preliminary CCRA cases before 1995 was gathered from three sources: the CBSA Historical Listing (<http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima/historic-e.html>), a list of CCRA decision dates provided by the Directorate, and the *Canada Gazette* microfiche collection at Harvard University. Similarly, CITT cases before 1988 were not available online, and information on these was gathered from the *Canada Gazette* microfiche.

The additional data collected for Canada beyond that described in section 2 is detailed in the following table:

Table 3.4.1 : Additional Canadian Data Included in AD-CAN-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-CAN-Master :		
U.	CASE_CBSA	Case code associated with the dumping investigation administered by the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA)
V.	CASE_CITT	Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT). Only assigned in the final stage.
W.	RELATED_CVD	Case code of a related countervailing duty investigation against the same product and country, see CVD-CAN workbook

X.	INIT_DATE_CBSA	Date of initiation of the case at the CBSA
Y.	INIT_DATE_CITT	Date of initiation of the case at the CITT
Z.	P_AVG_DUTY	The weighted average preliminary duty
AA.	F_AVG_DUTY	The weighted average final duty
AB.	TERM_DATE	The date a case was terminated for reasons such as the case was withdrawn by the petitioner or there was insignificant evidence of dumping
AC.	NOTES	Comments

In AD-CAN-Products :

D.	NOTES	Comments
-----------	--------------	----------

In AD-CAN-Domestic-Firms :

C.	NOTES	Comments
-----------	--------------	----------

In AD-CAN-Foreign-Firms :

D.	F_AD_MARGIN_FIRM	Final dumping margin in percentage terms of normal value as decided for a specific firm by the CBSA
E.	F_AD_NDUTY_FIRM	Final firm-specific dumping duty assessed in percentage terms of normal value
F.	F_AD_DUTYPAYABLE_FIRM	Final dumping margin in percentage terms of export price as decided for a specific firm by the CBSA
G.	F_AD_EDUTY_FIRM	Final firm-specific dumping duty assessed in percentage terms of export price
H.	NOTES	Comments

There are a few important caveats to the Canadian data with respect to the levels of duties imposed. Prior to 2001, most duties were reported in percentage terms of normal value, as opposed to percentage terms of export price. Thus, on the Master Spreadsheet, duties are in terms of normal value until case CAN-AD-302 (Cold-rolled steel sheet from Brazil). Furthermore, duties were usually imposed as ad valorem rates. Nevertheless, there were some instances in which the duty was imposed as a tax on any good entering Canada at a price lower than a given selling price reported to customs. Finally, the levels of duty described in the Master spreadsheet are typically the trade-weighted average margin of dumping found across all investigated firms. However, in some cases, the weighted average was not

available, so a proxy, such as the un-weighted average, was used instead. We include notes as to how the proxy was constructed.

Next, we were unable to verify the preliminary duty levels on cases appearing before CAN-AD-209 and on a few cases afterwards, i.e., CAN-AD-218 through CAN-AD-225. These were gathered from the CBSA Historical Listing, which we found to contain a few minor errors. Second, the dates for CITT cases before CAN-AD-79 were gathered from the *Gazette*, which means that these dates may be the publication dates for the decision, which usually occurred about 15 days after the actual decision date. The decision dates after CAN-AD-79 have been verified. Third, CITT dates for preliminary rulings before CAN-AD-272 were only available on a select number of cases that went to the final stage. Any cases that were terminated or suspended earlier lacked this information.

There are a few data columns that are redundant in the Canadian data. First, the P_AD_DATE series is largely identical to the P_DUMP_DEC series, as preliminary duties are assessed immediately from the date of the CBSA preliminary decision. Similarly, the F_AD_DATE is largely identical to the F_INJ_DEC, as final duties are assessed as soon as the CITT hands down an affirmative decision. Depending on the specifics of the tribunal's decision, the final duty may be applied retroactively to goods imported during the provisional duty period. Finally, the INIT_DATE series is identical to the INIT_DATE_CBSA series, as the CBSA always initiates an investigation before the CITT.

3.5 Colombia (COL)

In Colombia, injury, dumping, and causation are handled as a single track process. The main investigative authority is the Subdirección de Prácticas Comerciales (Assistant Director of Trade Practices), which is the body that processes claims in dumping cases. The Subdirección presents its findings to the Comité de Prácticas Comerciales (Trade Practices Committee) which makes a final recommendation. The Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo (Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Tourism) issues the overall decision corresponding to these recommendations. A more complete discussion (in Spanish) can be found at the Ministry website, <http://www.mincomercio.gov.co/>. The original source material for this

data can be found in the dumping/subsidizing section of that website, particularly in the summary excel sheet provided there.

The Colombian spreadsheet contains the standard data items described in section 2, as well as a few additional data items described below.

Table 3.5.1 : Additional Colombian Data Included in AD-COL-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-COL-Master :		
U.	TERM_DATE	Date of termination, usually instituted because the case was denied initiation
V.	P_AD_DUTY	The preliminary rate
W.	F_AD_DUTY	The final rate
X.	INIT_GP	The resolution number of the initiation action
Y.	P_GP	The resolution number of the preliminary decision of dumping and injury
Z.	F_GP	The resolution number of the final decision of dumping and injury
AA.	TERM_GP	The resolution number of the termination action
AB.	REVOKE_GP	The resolution number of the revocation action
AC.	NOTES	Comments
In AD-COL-Products :		
D.	NOTES	Comments

Because this data was compiled from a secondary source (the Ministry’s excel file), and not from the actual case files, some information is incomplete. It was unclear exactly when duties were imposed, so the P_AD_DATE and F_AD_DATE columns are largely missing. All other dates are those listed with the resolution numbers by the Ministry, which does not describe whether these are the dates of decision or of publication. Furthermore, termination dates and resolution numbers were only available for a select number of cases. Lastly, specific revocation resolutions were listed for only two cases. Other duties are known to have been revoked, but no details were available. Therefore, these revocations dates are simply listed as the standard five-year expiration date. Finally, the “DUMP” and “INJ” columns are identical,

since Colombia uses a single track antidumping process. Firm-specific information is also currently unavailable.

3.6 European Union (EUN)

Antidumping investigations in the European Union are handled by the Trade Directorate of the European Commission. Investigations follow a single-track i.e. the system assigns the responsibility for dumping and injury assessment only to the Commission. The initiations and outcomes of each investigation are published in the European Union's *Official Journal*. Electronic versions of antidumping-related documents are available online in the form of Information and Notices (prefix C) and Legislation (prefix L). The source of the data was primarily the European Union's *Official Journal* website. In cases where the online documents lacked certain data items, the Office for Official Publications provided the complete versions of these documents upon request by email. There is a fairly extensive research literature on various aspects of EU antidumping, e.g., for procedural descriptions and analyses see Messerlin (2001) and Vermulst (2005).

In addition to the standard antidumping information described in section 2, the AD-EUN workbook contains much additional information that may be of use to researchers, as we describe in the table below.

Table 3.6.1 : Additional EU Data Included in AD-EUN-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-EUN-Master :		
U.	INIT_GP	The government publication containing the initiation notice
V.	P_AD_DUTY	The preliminary antidumping duty imposed. If there were several duties imposed, this column contains the maximum dumping duty
W.	F_AD_DUTY	The final antidumping duty imposed. If there were several duties imposed, this column contains the maximum dumping duty
X.	P_AD_MARGIN	The preliminary dumping margin assessed. If there were several dumping margins assessed, this column contains the maximum dumping margin found
Y.	F_AD_MARGIN	The final dumping margin assessed. If there were several dumping margins assessed, this column contains the maximum dumping margin found
Z.	P_GP	The government publication containing the preliminary outcome of the

AA.	F_GP	investigation The government publication containing the final outcome of the investigation
AB.	NOTES	Comments

In AD-EUN-Products :

D.	CN_P_ex	This column indicates whether the HS code (referred to as the CN code in the European Union) of the good under investigation has an ‘ex’ prefix at the preliminary stage. The ‘ex’ prefix indicates that the products being investigated are only a subset of the products in the reported CN code.
E.	P_HS_CODE	The HS code of the investigated good at the preliminary stage
F.	SIG_DIGITS_P_HSCODE	Number of digits of the HS product code reported at the preliminary stage.
G.	CN_F_ex	This column indicates whether the HS code (referred to as the CN code in the European Union) of the good under investigation has an ‘ex’ prefix at the final stage. The ‘ex’ prefix indicates that the products being investigated are only a subset of the products in the reported CN code.
H.	F_HS_CODE	The HS code of the investigated good at the final stage
I.	SIG_DIGITS_F_HSCODE	Number of digits of the HS product code reported at the final stage
J.	NOTES	Comments

In AD-EUN-Domestic-Firms :

C.	COUNTRY	The European country in which the plaintiff domestic firm is located
-----------	----------------	--

In AD-EUN-Foreign-Firms :

D.	P_AD_MEASURE_FIRM	The firm-specific preliminary antidumping measure imposed
E.	P_AD_MARGIN	The firm-specific preliminary antidumping margin imposed
F.	F_AD_MARGIN	The firm-specific final antidumping margin imposed
G.	P_AD_DUTY	The firm-specific preliminary antidumping duty imposed
H.	F_AD_DUTY	The firm-specific final antidumping duty imposed
I.	NOTES	Comments

In terms of missing or incomplete data, the European Union dataset lacks information on reviews.

3.7 India (IND)

India’s antidumping process has a single track determination of injury and dumping, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Antidumping and Allied Duties in the Ministry of Commerce. The Designated Authority initiates and carries out both the dumping and the injury investigations, and makes a ruling based on its findings. Information on these investigations are made public through The

Gazette of India: Extraordinary (an issue of the Ministry of Commerce) and is available online at http://commerce.nic.in/ad_cases.htm. More information regarding the Indian antidumping process can be found in Kumaran (2005) and Banik (1998).

In addition to the standard antidumping information described in section 2, additional data collected for India is described below:

Table 3.7.1 : Additional Indian AD Data Included in AD-IND-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-IND-Master :		
U.	NOTES	Comments
In AD-IND-Domestic-Firms :		
C.	PET	A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm/entity in COLUMN B filed or supported the AD petition and 0 if the firm/entity forms part of the domestic industry and is mentioned in the investigation but did not file or act in support of the petition.
In AD-IND-Foreign-Firms :		
D.	F_AD_MARGIN	The firm-specific final antidumping margin imposed
E.	F_AD_DUTY	The firm-specific final antidumping duty imposed
F.	P_AD_MARGIN	The firm-specific preliminary antidumping margin imposed
G.	P_AD_DUTY	The firm-specific preliminary antidumping duty imposed

Aside from information on antidumping revocations (if any exist), there is nothing systematically missing from the Indian data for all investigations. Nevertheless, for any given investigation there may some missing elements such as dates, decisions or even product codes.

3.8 South Korea (KOR)

In South Korea, the Korean Trade Commission is wholly responsible for anti-dumping investigations. This quasi-judicial agency determines if dumping and/or injury has occurred for each case. The initiation

and outcomes of each investigation are published in the Korean Official Gazette (Gwanbo). The Korean Trade Commission also publishes information about ongoing antidumping cases online at its website. The source of the data was hard-copies of antidumping documents in Korean provided by the Korean Trade Commission. Summary information about Korea's antidumping process is available on the Korean Trade Commission's website.

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the Korean file contains additional data described in the table below.

Table 3.8.1 : Additional Korean Data Included in AD-KOR-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-KOR-Master :		
U.	P_AD_DUTY	The maximum (or range) of preliminary anti-dumping duty (duties) imposed
V.	F_AD_DUTY	The maximum (or range) of final anti-dumping duty (duties) imposed
W.	REVIEW_DUTY	The range and schedule of anti-dumping duties maintained after a sunset review
X.	REVIEW_F_DATE	The date when a sunset review final decision was taken
Y.	REVIEW_DUTY_DATE	The date when reviewed antidumping duties became effective
Z.	TYPE	A variable indicating if a sunset review was performed on the case (Review=Sunset Review was carried out)
In AD-KOR-Foreign-Firms:		
D.	F_AD_MARGIN	The maximum (or range) of firm-specific dumping margin(s) found at the final stage
E.	F_AD_DUTY	Details on the firm-specific antidumping duty (measures) imposed at the final stage.
F.	COUNTRY	The country in which the foreign exporting firm is located

In terms of missing or incomplete data, the Korean dataset is missing several cases for which hard-copy documents were not available, although antidumping investigations had been notified to the WTO, and this problem is especially severe between 2000 and 2004. The data is also missing the details on the government publications related to antidumping investigations at the initiation, preliminary, and final

stages. Finally, the database lacks some information on preliminary outcomes in certain cases and it does not contain information on when antidumping measures were revoked.

3.9 Mexico (MEX)

In Mexico, determinations of dumping and injury are made by one body, the Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales (UPCI, International Trade Practices Unit), which is part of the Secretaría de Economía. Unlike many other countries, the Mexican authority is quite likely to continue an investigation through the preliminary phase without placing duties. Mexico was one of the earlier Latin American countries to introduce a dumping investigation system, in place since 1987. The current law which governs this process can be found at the OAS SICE website, <http://www.sice.oas.org/antidumping/legislation/mexico/LCEXT.asp>. The data for this set was found in electronic copies of the Mexican case files. For a discussion of Mexico’s antidumping process see Leycegui and de la Torre (2005), as well as Niels and Francois (forthcoming).

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the Mexican file contains additional data described in the table below.

Table 3.9.1 : Additional Mexican Data Included in AD-MEX-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-MEX-Master :		
U.	RELATED_CVD	Case code of a related countervailing duty investigation against the same product and country, see MEX-CVD workbook
V.	P_AD_DUTY	The “all others” preliminary rate
W.	F_AD_DUTY	The “all others” final rate
X.	NOTES	Comments
Y.	FURTHER NOTES	Comments that would not fit in the first notes column
In AD-MEX-Products :		
D.	NOTES	Comments

In AD-MEX-Domestic-Firms :

C.	NOTES	Comments
-----------	--------------	----------

In AD-MEX-Foreign-Firms :

D.	F_AD_MARGIN_FIRM	Final firm-specific dumping margin
E.	NOTES	Comments

There were a number of difficulties in standardizing the Mexican data. First there was substantial variation in methods used to assess duties in the early cases. Rates could be expressed in per unit terms, as a percentage, or as the difference between an export price and a given normal value. Furthermore, some duties were only put in effect if the export price dropped below a set limit. Additionally, before the creation of the current dumping law, the Mexican authority could levy duties almost simultaneously with the case's initiation. They only needed to use the amounts of dumping established in the initiation brief to decide tax levels. Therefore, a number of early cases lack separate initiation dates, and instead have the same date listed for both the preliminary and initiation phases. Note also that the preliminary duty was often revised later in the process. Finally, prior to 2000, the dates in all series are those listed at the top of each case file, and these dates appear to be the dates of publication in the *Diario Oficial*. After 2000 the only available dates were those listed at the bottom of the case file, which appear to be the actual decision dates. Because of this inconsistency, P_AD_DATE and F_AD_DATE are incomplete. Note however that duties appeared to come into effect the day after publication.

A few columns are redundant, but were maintained to keep consistent with the overall format, because the same authority handles injury and dumping investigations in Mexico. P_DUMP_DATE and P_INJ_DATE are identical, as are P_DUMP_DEC and P_INJ_DEC

3.10 New Zealand (NZL)

In New Zealand, antidumping investigations are conducted by the Trade Remedies Group at the Ministry of Economic Development. The Trade Remedies Group publishes initiations and outcomes of

antidumping cases in the official New Zealand Gazette as well as on the Ministry of Economic Development's website. The source of the data was the Ministry's website which was combined with some information provided directly by the Trade Remedies Group. Information about New Zealand's antidumping investigative process can be found on the Ministry's website via the Trade Remedies link.

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the file for New Zealand contains additional data described in the table below.

Table 3.10.1 : Additional Data from New Zealand Included in AD-NZL-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-NZL-Master :		
U.	P_AD_DUTY	The preliminary anti-dumping duty for all non-named foreign exporting firms imposed
V.	F_AD_DUTY	The final anti-dumping duty for all non-named foreign exporting firms or range of duties imposed
W.	INIT_GP	The government publication containing the case initiation
X.	P_GP	The government publication containing the preliminary case outcomes
Y.	F_GP	The government publication containing the final case outcomes
Z.	NOTES	Comments
In AD-NZL-Foreign-Firms:		
D.	F_AD_MARGIN	The trade-weighted average (or range of) firm-specific dumping margin(s) found
E.	F_AD_DUTY	The ad-valorem equivalent of the firm-specific final antidumping duties imposed

In terms of missing or incomplete data, the New Zealand workbook does not contain preliminary outcomes because New Zealand's antidumping procedures differ from those of other countries in that a preliminary outcome is rarely issued unless provisional measures are imposed. Furthermore, the data is missing the references to government publications from 1999 onwards. The data also lacks exact details on final antidumping duties imposed as these are often in terms of reference prices – e.g., Normal Value (Value for Duty Equivalent) or Non-Injurious Free-On-Board - for further sub-classifications of the

investigated good. However, the workbook contains the ad-valorem equivalents of antidumping duties imposed as calculated by the Trade Remedies Group.

3.11 Peru (PER)

In Peru, one authority investigates both dumping and injury, La Comisión de Fiscalización de Dumping y Subsidios (Commission Investigating Dumping and Subsidies). This body is part of the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI). The actual laws governing this process can be found at the INDECOPI website (in Spanish).¹² This website includes the case files in html or PDF formats, which provided the source material for this data set. At the time of our data construction, this particular element of the Peruvian government's website infrastructure was a bit unreliable, thus we found it useful to save relevant web pages if they are needed for long-term use.

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the file for Peru contains additional data described in the table below.

Table 3.11.1 : Additional Peruvian Data Included in AD-PER-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-PER-Master :		
U.	P_AD_DUTY	Preliminary duty imposed
V.	F_AD_DUTY	Final duty imposed
W.	INIT_GP	Resolution number for the initiation action
X.	P_GP	Resolution number for the preliminary dumping/injury decision
Y.	F_GP	Resolution number for the final dumping/injury decision
Z.	REVOKE_GP	Resolution number for the revocation action
AA.	NOTES	Comments
In AD-PER-Products :		
D.	NOTES	Comments

¹² See <http://www.indecopi.gob.pe/legislacionyjurisprudencia/cds/antidumping.asp> , last accessed on 15 August 2005.

In AD-PER-Foreign-Firms :

D.	F_AD_MARGIN_FIRM	Final margin of dumping for a specific firm
E.	NOTES	Comments

The primary concern with the Peruvian data is that it is incomplete. The INDECOPI site does have the majority of the case files as several early investigations seem to be missing, and the documentation ends in 2002.

3.12 Turkey (TUR)

The Turkish antidumping process is administered by two separate bodies, the “Board of Evaluation of Unfair Competition in Importation” (the Board) and the “Department of Dumping and Subsidy Investigation” (the Department). According to the Turkish government’s website,

“The Board is an independent body consisting of 8 members, representing 7 different public institutions and non-profit organisations. The Board is empowered to take decisions for the initiation of an investigation, acceptance of undertakings, termination of an investigation or imposition of anti-dumping duties. The Department is subordinated to the Prime Ministry Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, Directorate General for Imports. The Department is entitled to make preliminary examination upon complaint, to present proposals to the Board on whether to initiate an investigation or to take measures and to carry out such investigations.” (DTM, 2005)

Despite the existence of two bodies the investigations tend to follow a single track procedure as announcements on dumping and injury tend to be made simultaneously. Announcements are published in the Turkish government’s *Official Gazette* (Resmî Gazete) publications which is available online, but only in Turkish.

In addition to the basic antidumping data described in section 2, additional data for Turkey is as described in the following table

Table 3.12.1 : Additional Turkish Data Included in AD-TUR-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-TUR-Master :		
U.	P_AD_DUTY	Description of the preliminary antidumping duty imposed
V.	F_AD_DUTY	Description of the final antidumping duty imposed
W.	F_AD_GP	<i>Official Gazette</i> government publication number documenting the final antidumping determination

3.13 United States (USA)

The United States' antidumping process is a two-track procedure handled by two distinct government agencies – the dumping investigations are administered by the International Trade Administration within the Department of Commerce, and the injury investigations are handled by the quasi-judicial United States International Trade Commission. Information on United States' antidumping investigations is reported by these agencies to the public through the *Federal Register*. The US antidumping process has been studied extensively, see for example, Boltuck and Litan (1991), Staiger and Wolak (1994), Blonigen and Prusa (2004), Horlick (2005), and Nelson (forthcoming).

In addition to the standard antidumping information described in section 2, the AD-USA workbook contains much additional information¹³ that may be of use to researchers.

Table 3.13.1 : Additional US Data Included in AD-USA-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-USA-Master :		
U.	CASE_ITA	Case code associated with the dumping investigation administered by the International Trade Administration (ITA) at the Department of Commerce
V.	CASE_ITC	Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the US International Trade Commission (ITC)
W.	RELATED_CVD	Case code of a related countervailing duty investigation against the same

¹³ Much of the information in the workbook on US domestic and foreign firms is graciously provided by Bruce A. Blonigen as posted at his website, <http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bruceb/adpage.html>. The data can also be compiled from notifications to the *Federal Register* (foreign firms and outcomes) and the ITA's website, <http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/pet-init.htm> (domestic petitioners), last accessed on 22 July 2005.

X.	ITC_REPCODE	product and country, see CVD-USA workbook First (chronological) ITC case code for multiple country/identical product antidumping investigations
Y.	INIT_DATE_ITA	Date of initiation of the case at the ITA
Z.	INIT_DATE_ITC	Date of initiation of the case at the ITC
AA.	TERM_DATE	Date of termination of investigation if terminated
AB.	P_AD_DUTY	Preliminary “all other firm” antidumping duty imposed
AC.	F_AD_DUTY	Final “all other firm” antidumping duty imposed
AD.	INIT_ITA_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for initiation at the ITA
AE.	INIT_ITC_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for initiation at the ITC
AF.	P_DUMP_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for ITA preliminary dumping determination
AG.	P_INJ_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for ITC preliminary injury determination
AH.	F_DUMP_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for ITA final dumping determination
AI.	F_INJ_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for ITC final injury determination
AJ.	F_AD_MEASURE_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for imposition of antidumping measure order
AK.	REVOKE_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for revocation of antidumping order
AL.	NOTES	Comments

In AD-USA-Products :

D.	TS_CODE	Prior to 1989, the US did not subscribe to the HS system and instead used the TSUSA system to classify imports, thus this column reports the pre-1989 cases which referenced the investigated products’ 5-7 digit TSUSA code
E.	TS_DIGITS	Number of digits of the TSUSA product code reported in TS_CODE (e.g., 5,7, etc.)
F.	CASE_ITC	Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the US International Trade Commission (ITC)
G.	NOTES	Comments

In AD-USA-Domestic-Firms :

C.	CASE_ITC	Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the US International Trade Commission (ITC)
-----------	-----------------	--

In AD-USA-Foreign-Firms :

D.	CASE_ITC	Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the US International Trade Commission (ITC)
-----------	-----------------	--

In terms of missing or incomplete data, the US data set is complete, with the exception of information on domestic and foreign firms involved in the investigations – that data is only collected through investigation USA-AD-1058 (cases initiated through October 2003). More recent data on firms can be updated from the *Federal Register*.

3.14 Venezuela (VEN)

Venezuela has a single track antidumping investigation procedure administered by the Comisión Antidumping y Sobre Subsidios (CASS, Anti-dumping and Subsidy Commission), which is assisted by the Secretaría Técnica (ST). CASS issues the rulings, while the ST helps with administration and investigation duties. The Venezuelan system was instituted in the early 1990s. The CASS website, <http://www.cass.com.ve/> contains useful information on the dumping legislation and on the cases themselves. However, the Venezuelan internet infrastructure is relatively unreliable, so we found it useful to archive pages offline for extended use. This site provided the information for this data set.

In addition to the standard data described in section 2, the file for Venezuela contains additional data described in the table below.

Table 3.14.1 : Additional Venezuelan Data Included in AD-VEN-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-VEN-Master :		
U.	TERM_DATE	Date of the termination action
V.	P_AD_DUTY	Preliminary antidumping duty imposed
W.	F_AD_DUTY	Final antidumping duty imposed
X.	INIT_GP	Decision number of the initiation action
Y.	P_GP	Decision number of the preliminary dumping/injury determination
Z.	F_GP	Decision number of the final dumping/injury determination
AA.	TERM_GP	Decision number of the termination action
AB.	REVOKE_GP	Decision number of the revocation action
AC.	CASE_WORKING_ID	Number on the folders used to organize the case files
AD.	NOTES	Comments

In AD-VEN-Products :

D.	NOTES	Comments
-----------	--------------	----------

In AD-VEN-Foreign-Firms :

D.	F_AD_MARGIN_FIRM	Final dumping margin for a specific firm
E.	NOTES	Comments

The Venezuelan data typically reports duties in CIF (cost, insurance, freight) terms, though on some occasions they are reported as FOB (free on board). Furthermore, the data in P_AD_DATE and F_AD_DATE is missing. Resolutions would come into effect on the date of publication, but that date was not usually listed in the files. Some notes on publication may be available on the CASS website. Also, the “DUMP” and “INJ” series are largely identical, because CASS makes both decisions simultaneously.

3.15 South Africa (ZAF)

South African antidumping investigations are administered by the Trade Remedies Directorates in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The outcomes of investigations are published in the International Trade Administration Commission’s reports. Data for South Africa was kindly provided by Gustav Brink and is based on Brink (2005). Holden (2002) provides an earlier analysis of South African antidumping as a reaction to trade liberalization or an anti-competitive instrument. The two articles contain descriptions of the antidumping process in South Africa, but a current summary of antidumping procedures can be found on the Department of Industry and Trade’s website.

The South African workbook contains the standard data items, as in Section 2, as well as a few additional data items described below.

Table 3.15.1 : Additional South African Data Included in AD-ZAF-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In AD-ZAF-Master :		
U.	P_AD_DUTY	The maximum (or range of) preliminary antidumping duty (duties) imposed
V.	F_AD_DUTY	The maximum (or range of) final antidumping duty (duties) imposed
W.	GP_P_Report	The government publication reporting the outcomes of the preliminary stage
X.	GP_F_Report	The government publication reporting the outcomes of the final stage
In AD-ZAF-Foreign-Firms:		
D.	AD_MARGIN_FIRM	The final firm-specific dumping margin(s) found
E.	P_AD_DUTY	The preliminary firm-specific antidumping duty imposed
F.	F_AD_DUTY	The final firm-specific antidumping duty imposed

In terms of missing or incomplete data, the South Africa dataset lacks dates when preliminary antidumping duties came into effect as well as dates when antidumping measures were revoked. Furthermore, the data set is missing preliminary outcomes, final outcomes, and HS codes for a few cases where hard-copy documents were missing. Finally, firm-specific information for a few cases where these were not published in the government reports.

4 AD-Using Countries with Data on Initiations Only

As indicated already in table 1.1, there are a number of countries that also use antidumping policies but for which we have not managed to collect data, typically because of the lack of transparency making the data inaccessible. While most of these other (“OTH”) countries would qualify as “new” users, some of them have become quite prolific users of the antidumping policy instrument. For a discussion of various countries use of antidumping, see Bundjamin (2005) for Indonesia, Sutham, Attavipach and Eiamchinda (2005) for Thailand, and Tian (2005) for China.

Thus, in a separate file included in the data set (AD-OTH-v1.0.xls) we document basic information from the WTO on initiations by member countries (described below) over 1995-2003 that are not part of the more detailed database described in sections 2 and 3:

Table 4.1.1 : Other Antidumping User Countries with Initiation Information Only in the Database

Country Code (3-letter CTY)	Country Name	Excel Workbook File Name	Spreadsheet Names within Country Workbook	Available Years of Data	Current Version (last updated)
BGR	Bulgaria		AD-BGR-Master ,		
CHL	Chile		AD-CHL-Master ,		
CHN	China		AD-CHN-Master ,		
CRI	Costa Rica		AD-CRI-Master ,		
CZE	Czech Republic		AD-CZE-Master ,		
ECU	Ecuador		AD-ECU-Master ,		
EGY	Egypt		AD-EGY-Master ,		
GTM	Guatemala		AD-GTM-Master ,		
IDN	Indonesia		AD-IDN-Master ,		
ISR	Israel		AD-ISR-Master ,		
JAM	Jamaica		AD-JAM-Master ,		
JPN	Japan		AD-JPN-Master ,		
LVA	Latvia		AD-LVA-Master ,		
LTU	Lithuania	AD-OTH-v1.0.xls	AD-LTU-Master ,	1995-2003	v1.0 (8/2005)
MYS	Malaysia		AD-MYS-Master ,		
NIC	Nicaragua		AD-NIC-Master ,		
PAK	Pakistan		AD-PAK-Master ,		
PAN	Panama		AD-PAN-Master ,		
PRY	Paraguay		AD-PRY-Master ,		
PHL	Philippines		AD-PHL-Master ,		
POL	Poland		AD-POL-Master ,		
SVN	Slovenia		AD-SVN-Master ,		
TWN	Taiwan		AD-TWN-Master ,		
THA	Thailand		AD-THA-Master ,		
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago		AD-TTO-Master ,		
URY	Uruguay		AD-URY-Master		

The source of this original data was its collection in Miranda, Torres and Ruiz (1998) and has since been updated by the WTO. We report only the information available in the WTO dataset on investigations for other WTO members, as detailed in the table below, with one “Master” sheet per using country:

Table 4.1.2 : Variables in the AD-OTH-Master Spreadsheets

Column	Variable Name	Description
A.	AD_CTY_NAME	Country name of the user initiating the antidumping investigation
B.	CASE_ID	Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the data base [generated by us]
C.	CASE_REPCODE	Related antidumping investigations of multiple countries at the same time over the same product
D.	INV_CTY_NAME	Country name of the foreign country under investigation
E.	INV_CTY_CODE	3-letter UN country code of the foreign country under investigation (see table 2.2)
F.	PRODUCT	Description of the product under investigation
G.	INIT_DATE	Date of initiation of the investigation (MM/DD/YEAR)

5 Countervailing Duty-Using Countries in the Database

The data for each CVD user country is contained in a Microsoft Excel 2003 Workbook file (posted at http://www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/), within which are typically two spreadsheets of data: 1) a master spreadsheet with basic antidumping case investigation information; and 2) a spreadsheet containing information on the Harmonized System (HS) products under investigation. There are only three countries with detailed countervailing duty data in the database thus far:

Table 5.1 : Antidumping User Countries with Detailed Data in the Database

Country Code (3-letter CTY)	Country Name	Excel Workbook File Name	Spreadsheet Names within Country Workbook	Available Years of Data	Current Version (last updated)
CAN	Canada	CVD-CAN-v1.0.xls	CVD-CAN-Master , CVD-CAN-Products	1985-2005	v1.0 (8/2005)
MEX	Mexico	CVD-MEX-v1.0.xls	CVD-MEX-Master , CVD-MEX-Products	1990-2003	v1.0 (8/2005)
USA	United States	CVD-USA-v1.0.xls	CVD-USA-Master , CVD-USA-Products	1980-2005	v1.0 (8/2005)

The rest of section 5 details how each of these two basic spreadsheets is formatted for consistency across the CVD-user countries, before turning to country-specific descriptions for unique data found for each country.

5.1 The “Master” Spreadsheet for Each Country – CVD-CTY-Master

Each country has a master spreadsheet presenting a common set of information. The CVD-CTY-Master¹⁴ spreadsheet has the same 21 initial column headings (Columns A through T) for each of the using countries that we describe below. For each additional country, columns U through (END) contain unique variables depending on the country’s nuances of its own antidumping process and the availability of reported information. The following table describes the contents of the first 21 rows of each master spreadsheet for each country.

Table 5.1.1 : Variables in the CVD-CTY-Master Spreadsheets

Column	Variable Name	Description
A.	CVD_CTY_NAME	Country name of the user initiating the countervailing duty investigation
B.	CASE_ID	Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the data base [generated by us]
C.	CASE_REPCODE	Related CVD investigations of multiple countries at the same time over the same product
D.	INV_CTY_NAME	Country name of the foreign country under investigation
E.	INV_CTY_CODE	3-letter UN country code of the foreign country under investigation (see table 2.2)
F.	PRODUCT	Description of the product under investigation
G.	INIT_DATE	Date of initiation of the investigation (MM/DD/YEAR)
H.	P_SUB_DATE	Date of preliminary subsidy decision (MM/DD/YEAR)
I.	P_INJ_DATE	Date of preliminary injury decision (MM/DD/YEAR)
J.	P_SUB_DEC	Preliminary subsidy decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency), P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative), B(ypassed, as sometimes the preliminary decision is skipped and the first decision is the final decision), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of the investigation)
K.	P_INJ_DEC	Preliminary injury decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to

¹⁴ CTY is replaced with the 3-letter UN country code for each of the 15 user countries in the data set.

ruling by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency), P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative), B(ypassed, as sometimes the preliminary decision is skipped and the first decision is the final decision), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of the investigation)

L.	P_CVD_DATE	Date of imposition of preliminary countervailing measure (MM/DD/YEAR)
M.	P_CVD_MEASURE	Preliminary countervailing measure imposed: AVD (= ad valorem duty), SD (= specific duty), PU (= price undertaking), DPU (=duty if price falls under a given level), SA (= suspension agreement)
N.	F_SUB_DATE	Date of final subsidy decision (MM/DD/YEAR)
O.	F_INJ_DATE	Date of final injury decision (MM/DD/YEAR)
P.	F_SUB_DEC	Final subsidy decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency), P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of the investigation)
Q.	F_INJ_DEC	Final injury decision: A(ffirmative), N(egative), W(ithdrawn prior to ruling by petitioning industry), T(erminated prior to ruling by government agency), P(artial – some products were found affirmative/others negative), OTH(er, explain in the notes section), “.” (not relevant as case never reached that stage of the investigation)
R.	F_CVD_DATE	Date of imposition of final countervailing measure (MM/DD/YEAR)
S.	F_CVD_MEASURE	Final countervailing measure imposed: AVD (= ad valorem duty), SD (= specific duty), PU (= price undertaking), DPU (=duty if price falls under a given level), SA (= suspension agreement)
T.	REVOKE_DATE	Date of revocation of countervailing measure (MM/DD/YEAR)

Before describing the other spreadsheets available across countries, it is important to point out that for a number of countries, much of the data described in the master spreadsheet may be redundant. For example, for a “single track” country that has one government agency carrying out a simultaneous injury and subsidy investigation, the preliminary subsidy and injury decisions (and any measures imposed) might take place on the same date. The same is likely to be the case for final decisions as well. Because some countries have “dual track” investigative processes, we have chosen this approach so as to have some standardization across country spreadsheets.

5.2 The “Product” Spreadsheets – CVD-CTY-Products

Each user country also has a spreadsheet presenting information on the Harmonized System (HS) product codes listed in the countervailing duty investigation petition. The CVD-CTY-Products spreadsheet has the

same 3 initial column headings (Columns A through C) for each of the using countries, listed in table 2.2.1 .

Table 5.2.1 : Variables in the CVD-CTY-Products Spreadsheets

Column	Variable Name	Description
D.	CASE_ID	Case identifier used to link observations across different elements of the data base [generated by us]
E.	HS_CODE	Harmonized System product code for the product under investigation
F.	HS_DIGITS	Number of digits of the HS product code reported in HS_CODE

5.3 Canada (CAN)

Canada’s countervailing duty cases are handled by the same authorities that investigate dumping. The Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Directorate of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA, formerly the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, CCRA) examines subsidy issues, while injury determinations are made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT). Before late 2000, the CITT initiated an investigation only in two cases: after a preliminary determination of subsidizing had been made by the CCRA or if an interested party referred the issue of injury to the tribunal. The data sources used for these figures are identical to those used for the Canadian dumping data described in section 3.

The Canadian CVD workbook contains the standard data items described above as well as a few additional data items described below.

Table 5.3.1 : Additional Canadian Data Included in CVD-CAN-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In CVD-CAN-Master :		
U.	CASE_CBSA	Case code associated with the subsidy investigation administered

V.	CASE_CITT	by the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT). Only assigned in the final stage.
W.	INIT_DATE_CBSA	Date of initiation of the case at the CBSA
X.	INIT_DATE_CITT	Date of initiation of the case at the CITT
Y.	P_AVG_DUTY	The weighted average preliminary duty
Z.	F_AVG_DUTY	The weighted average final duty
AA.	TERM_DATE	The date a case was terminated for reasons such as the case was withdrawn by the petitioner or there was insignificant evidence of dumping
AB.	NOTES	Comments

In CVD-CAN-Products :

D.	NOTES	Comments
-----------	--------------	----------

In terms of the data, the duties were usually reported in per unit terms until CAN-CVD-24, when duties were imposed as a percentage of the export price, for the most part. Second, preliminary case information for the years covered by hard-copy cases were not available at the time of data collection, so a number of duty values are missing in that time period.

5.4 Mexico (MEX)

As with Mexican dumping investigations, subsidy cases are investigated by the Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales (UPCI, International Trade Practices Unit), part of the Secretaría de Economía. Countervailing duty investigations are far less common than antidumping actions. The first cases described in the database date from 1990, while dumping cases began in 1987. Regardless, countervailing duty investigations follow the same track as that used for dumping, with the UPCI ruling on both injury and the existence of subsidies simultaneously. The data here was gathered from electronic copies of the existing case files.

The Mexican CVD workbook contains the standard data items described above as well as a few additional data items described below.

Table 5.4.1 : Additional Mexican Data Included in CVD-MEX-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In CVD-MEX-Master :		
U.	P_CVD_DUTY	Preliminary “all others” rate
V.	F_CVD_DUTY	Final “all others” rate
W.	NOTES	Comments

There are a few notable omissions in the current data set. In particular, the P_CVD_DATE and F_CVD_DATE series are missing, since the publication dates of decisions were not verifiable. Normally duties would come into effect the day after publication. We believe that the dates listed are the publication dates, but this would require further checking against the *Diario*. Finally, the “SUB” and “INJ” columns are redundant, since Mexico has a one-track injury/subsidy investigation process.

5.5 United States (USA)

Countervailing duty cases in the United States are investigated by the International Trade Administration (ITA) and the International Trade Commission (ITC). The ITC handles the injury determination, while the ITA determines the existence of countervailable subsidies. However, a number of cases prior to 1995 did not require ITC rulings because the target country was not a signatory to the Tokyo Round’s plurilateral Subsidy Agreement. Many of these cases are identified by ITC numbers in the form “COUNTRY-#” (such as COLOMBIA-1), which were created during data collection. The data was compiled from the *Federal Register*.

The United States’ CVD workbook contains the standard data items described above as well as a few additional data items described below.

Table 5.5.1 : Additional US Data Included in CVD-USA-v1.0.xls

Column	Variable Name	Description
In CVD-USA-Master :		
U.	CASE_ITA	Case code associated with the subsidy investigation administered by the International Trade Administration (ITA)
V.	CASE_ITC	Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the International Trade Commission (ITC)
W.	ITC_REPCODE	First (chronological) ITC case code for multiple country/identical product investigations
X.	INIT_DATE_ITA	Date of initiation of the case at the ITA
Y.	INIT_DATE_ITC	Date of initiation of the case at the ITC
Z.	TERM_DATE	Date of the termination action
AA.	P_CVD_DUTY	The preliminary “all others” rate
AB.	F_CVD_DUTY	The final “all others” rate
AC.	INIT_ITA_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for initiation at the ITA
AD.	INIT_ITC_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for initiation at the ITC
AE.	P_SUB_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for ITA preliminary subsidy determination
AF.	P_INJ_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for ITC preliminary injury determination
AG.	F_SUB_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for ITA final subsidy determination
AH.	F_INJ_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for ITC final injury determination
AI.	F_CVD_MEASURE_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for imposition of countervailing measure order
AJ.	TERM_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for termination of the case
AK.	REVOKE_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for revocation of countervailing duty order
AL.	SUSP_GP	Citation to the <i>Federal Register</i> government publication for suspension of the case and acceptance of a suspension agreement
AM.	NOTES	Comments
In CVD-USA-Products :		
D.	TS_CODE	Prior to 1989, the US did not subscribe to the HS system and instead used the TSUSA system to classify imports, thus this column reports the pre-1989 cases which referenced the investigated products’ 5-7 digit TSUSA code
E.	TS_DIGITS	Number of digits of the TSUSA product code reported in TS_CODE (e.g., 5,7, etc.)
F.	CASE_ITC	Case code associated with the injury investigation administered by the US International Trade Commission (ITC)
G.	NOTES	Comments

6 Caveats for Data Use, Discovery of Errors, and Conclusions

Given that the database has not yet been used in any actual research (that might help identify errors in the coding of data), we are certain that there are typographical errors, as well as errors that are more fundamental in nature in the data set. We also note that the quality of data available across countries varies substantially. To the extent that county notifications were unclear and data entry and collection require our research assistants to make decisions involving discretion at the margin, there is likely to be inconsistencies and the introduction of errors. As the data collection project is ongoing, we will correct such errors and repost the more accurate data to the research community via the website if notified by email at crown@brandeis.edu. Our intention is to correct errors and to fill in the remaining holes of missing data for countries for which we have not been able to track down detailed data, and then to make the additional data available with updated and more accurate information at the website.

It is also important to point out that researchers who have experience focusing on the United States or the European Union's antidumping process may be quite surprised when examining the data of other using countries for the first time, as their investigative procedures may be quite different. Furthermore, for many of the new user countries especially, there may be learning-by-doing with respect to antidumping. Thus, it was sometimes challenging for even an experienced AD researcher to always determine what government agencies were deciding, when they were making decisions, and what the exact antidumping measures were that were being imposed. Finally, antidumping measures in new user countries are extremely likely to be in the form of specific duties or complicated price undertaking arrangements with threats to reversion to duties if minimum price thresholds are not met. These outcomes, of course, make the coding of data difficult to standardize, especially in comparison to antidumping measures applied as ad valorem duties.

Next, given language barriers and translation difficulties as well as the actions of new user countries, we are least confident in the accuracy of the exact *dates* of decisions and impositions reported in the spreadsheets. For example, there are likely instances where the date of a government publication reporting the antidumping outcome/decision was used in lieu of the date that the actual announcement

was made (which may not have been reported in a government publication in some countries until one or two weeks later). For most research using low frequency (e.g., yearly) data the exact date is not necessarily important. However, imprecise or inaccurate dates could have implications, for example, for event studies which match investigation announcements with high frequency data on economic activity (e.g., stock price movements). In such instances researchers are invited to go back and check the original government publications to verify the exact dates and timing of announcements and impositions.

Furthermore, the “start” years (in table 2.1) of available data for each user country do not necessarily indicate when the use of the AD instrument in a given country might have begun. It only represents the year for which we were first able to collect detailed data for the user countries. Furthermore, there is a substantial amount of missing data (denoted with ‘MI’) for the outcomes of antidumping investigations initiated in more recent years given the time lag to when government publications make information on outcomes available in some countries.

While we have reported data on antidumping revocations wherever they were available, for the most part when we could not find data on revocations of a final AD measure that was imposed we treated it as not revoked (a “.” entry, as opposed to a missing, “MI,” entry), though this is admittedly a guess based on the presumption that antidumping measures are politically difficult to remove once in place. Thus any research interested in focusing on the removal of antidumping measures should not treat this data set as exhaustive of such information, as this was admittedly not a priority in terms of initial data collection and reporting.

References

- Banik, Nilanjan (1998) "Antidumping Measures - an Indian Perspective," Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, manuscript.
- Bartelsman, Eric J., Randy A. Becker, and Wayne B. Gray (2000) "NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database" available at <http://www.nber.org/nberces/nbprod96.htm>, June.
- Blonigen, Bruce A. (2000) "U.S. Antidumping Database Webpage," available at <http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bruceb/adpage.html>, last accessed on 19 July 2005.
- Blonigen, Bruce A. and Chad P. Bown (2003) "Antidumping and Retaliation Threats," *Journal of International Economics* 60(2): 249-273.
- Blonigen, Bruce A. and Thomas J. Prusa (2003) "The Cost of Antidumping: The Devil is in the Details," *Journal of Policy Reform* 6(4): 233-245.
- Blonigen, Bruce A. and Thomas J. Prusa (2004) "Antidumping," in E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan (eds.) *Handbook of International Trade* Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
- Boltuck, Richard and Robert Litan, eds. (1991) *Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Bown, Chad P. (2005) "Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why Are So Few Challenged?" *Journal of Legal Studies* 34(2): 515-555.
- Bown, Chad P. and Meredith A. Crowley (forthcoming) "Policy Externalities: How U.S. Antidumping Affects Japanese Exports to the E.U.," *European Journal of Political Economy*.
- Bown, Chad P. and Meredith A. Crowley (2005a) "Trade Deflection and Trade Depression," Brandeis University manuscript, August (revised).
- Bown, Chad P. and Meredith A. Crowley (2005b) "China's Export Growth: Threat to the International Trading System?" Brandeis University manuscript, August.
- Brink, Gustav (2005) "The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument in South Africa," *Journal of World Trade* 39(1): 147-158.
- Bundjamin, Erry (2005) "The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument in Indonesia," *Journal of World Trade* 39(1): 125-136.
- Caetano, Ana (2005) "The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument in Brazil," *Journal of World Trade* 39(1): 87-96.
- Durling, James and Thomas J. Prusa (forthcoming) "The Trade Effects Associated with an Antidumping Epidemic: The Hot-Rolled Steel Market, 1996-2001," *European Journal of Political Economy*.
- DTM (2005) "Anti-Dumping Practices in Turkey," Undersecretariat of the Prime Minister for Foreign Trade website, <http://www.dtm.gov.tr/ithalat/english/trade/anti.htm>, last accessed on 20 August 2005.

- Feenstra, Robert C. (1997) "U.S. Exports, 1978-1994: With State Exports and other U.S. Data," *NBER Working Paper No. 5990*, April.
- Feenstra, Robert C., John Romalis and Peter K. Schott (2002) "U.S. Imports, Exports and Tariff Data, 1989 to 2001." *NBER Working Paper No. 9387*, November.
- Feinberg, Robert M. and Kara M. Reynolds (forthcoming) "The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings," *Southern Economic Journal*.
- Finger, J. Michael and Julio N. Nogués (2005) *Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization: Fighting Fire With Fire*, Palgrave and the World Bank.
- Holden, Merle (2002) "Antidumping: A Reaction to Trade Liberalisation or Anti-Competitive?" *The South African Journal of Economics*, June.
- Horlick, Gary N. (2005) "The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument in the United States," *Journal of World Trade* 39(1): 169-179.
- Horlick, Gary N. and Edwin Vermulst (2005) "The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument: An Attempt at Synthesis," *Journal of World Trade* 39(1): 67-74.
- Kumaran, V. Lakshmi (2005) "The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument in India," *Journal of World Trade* 39(1): 115-124.
- Kumé, Honorio and Guida Piani (2005) "Antidumping and Safeguard Mechanisms: The Brazilian Experience, 1988-2003," in J. Michael Finger and Julio N. Nogués, eds. *Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization: Fighting Fire With Fire*, Palgrave and the World Bank.
- Leycegui, Beatriz and Luz Elena Reyes de la Torre (2005) "The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument in Mexico," *Journal of World Trade* 39(1): 137-146.
- Messerlin, Patrick A. (2001) *Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe: European Commercial Policy in the 2000s*. Washington, Institute for International Economics.
- Messerlin, Patrick A. (2004) "China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards," *World Bank Economic Review* 18(1): 105-130.
- Miranda, Jorge, Raul A. Torres, Raul and Mario Ruiz (1998) "The International Use of Antidumping: 1987-1997." *Journal of World Trade* 32(5): 5-71.
- Moulis, Daniel and Patrick Gay (2005) "The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument in Australia," *Journal of World Trade* 39(1): 75-86.
- Nelson, Douglas (forthcoming) "The Political Economy of Anti-Dumping: A Survey." *European Journal of Political Economy*.
- Nelson, Douglas and Hylke Vandenbussche, eds. (forthcoming) *The WTO and Antidumping*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

- Niels, Gunnar and Joseph Francois (forthcoming) "Business Cycles, the Exchange Rate, and Demand for Antidumping Protection in Mexico," *Review of Development Economics*.
- Nogués, Julio N. and Elias Baracat (2005) "The Political-Economy of Antidumping and Safeguards in Argentina," in J. Michael Finger and Julio N. Nogués, eds. *Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization: Fighting Fire With Fire*, Palgrave and the World Bank.
- Prusa, Thomas J. (2001) "On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping," *Canadian Journal of Economics* 34(3): 591-611.
- Prusa, Thomas J., and Susan Skeath (2002) "The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* 138(3): 389-413
- Prusa, Thomas J., and Susan Skeath (2005) "Modern Commercial Policy: Managed Trade or Retaliation?" in James Hartigan (ed.), *Handbook of International Trade and Law*. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing.
- Staiger, Robert W. and Frank A. Wolak (1994) "Measuring Industry-Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics* 51-118.
- Sutham, Apisith John, Parate Attavipach and Patamaporn Eiamchinda (2005) "The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument in Thailand," *Journal of World Trade* 39(1): 159-168.
- Tian, Yu (2005) "The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument in the People's Republic of China," *Journal of World Trade* 39(1): 97-104.
- Vermulst, Edwin (2005) "The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument in the European Community," *Journal of World Trade* 39(1): 105-114.
- WTO (2005a) "Anti-dumping Initiations: by Reporting Member," on-line excel spreadsheet available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab2_e.xls , last accessed on 20 August 2005.
- WTO (2005b) "Anti-dumping Measures: by Reporting Member," on-line excel spreadsheet available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab7_e.xls , last accessed on 20 August 2005.
- Zanaradi, Maurizio (2004) "Antidumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?" *The World Economy* 27(3): 403-433.